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On the Origins of Human Rights 
Matthew Nicholson
Abstract: This article reviews Pamela Slotte’s and Miia Halme-Tuomisaari’s edited volume 
Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights, treating it as an opportunity to reconsider theories about the 
history and origins of human rights thought and practice. It argues that the re-origination of human 
rights thought and practice in the context of contemporary realities should be prioritised over attempts 
to historicise human rights discourse, drawing on the work of philosopher and cultural theorist Walter 
Benjamin to advance this argument. 
Introduction 
This article considers contemporary thinking about the origins of human rights, focussing on Pamela 
Slotte’s and Miia Halme-Tuomisaari’s 2015 edited volume Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights 
(references in this article are to the 2018 paperback edition).1 Despite its title the book says relatively 
little about what origins are or how they might be theorised within human rights discourse. Across 
chapters covering topics ranging from human rights in antiquity,2 the revolutionary potential of human 
rights,3 Italian nineteenth-century rights theorist Giuseppe Mazzini,4 and human rights and the peace 
movement,5 to the American approach to human rights during the Cold War,6 the book focuses more 
on particular moments in human rights’ history than on how the origins of human rights are or might 
be conceptualised.   
Taking the relative lack of focus on origins in a book that is ostensibly about the origins of human rights 
as its starting point, this article is a review of Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s book and an attempt to 
go beyond that book’s limited engagement with origins. It seeks to say something about what is at stake 
in thinking about the origins of human rights and to argue for a particular approach to the origins of 
human rights – an approach that has, I suggest, the potential to re-originate human rights thinking and 
practice.   
 
                                                          
 Assistant Professor in International Law, Durham University, Durham Law School, 
matthew.c.nicholson@durham.ac.uk. Warm thanks to Aoife O’Donoghue (Durham) and Ruth Houghton 
(Newcastle) for discussions on themes connected to this article, to the editors for their helpful comments and 
suggestions, and to the anonymous reviewers for their guidance and suggestions, which improved this article. 
Some of the research reflected in this article was undertaken during doctoral study at UCL. I am very grateful to 
Dr Ralph Wilde and Professor Catherine Redgwell for their generosity and support as supervisors, and to UCL’s 
Graduate School for financial support of my doctoral work. All errors and inadequacies are my fault.     
1 P. Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 
[2015]). 
2 J. Giltaij and K. Tuori, “Human Rights in Antiquity? Revisiting anachronism and Roman law”, in P. Slotte and 
M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 39.  
3 L. Hunt, “Revolutionary rights”, in P. Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human 
Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 105.  
4 S. Moyn, “Giuseppe Mazzini in (and beyond) the history of human rights”, in P. Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari 
(eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 119.  
5 M. Ceadel, “The peace movement and human rights”, in P. Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting 
the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 189.  
6 O. Barsalou, “The Cold War and the rise of an American conception of human rights, 1945-8”, in P. Slotte and 
M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 362.  
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Origins / Structure 
In this section I consider the book’s indirect engagement with the origins of human rights, revealing the 
under-articulated concept of origins at its core. In the next section I trace this under-articulated concept 
across the book’s chapters.  
Conceptualising origins in terms of a point of origin, Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari ask “[w]here … the 
history of human rights begin[s]” and whether there is “such a distinguishable entity as ‘the history of 
human rights’” in the introductory chapter.7 They present “th[eir] book [as] conceptualiz[ing] human 
rights as open-ended and ambiguous … formed around an ideal of the universal human being as free 
and equal in particular,”8 glossing over the homogenizing effects of the idea that there is such a person 
as “the universal human being.” 
In the book’s foreword Martti Koskenniemi suggests its “ambition” is to “attain a more realistic image 
of the role rights have as aspects of political speech” by “connecting rights-vocabularies with past 
efforts to gain, exercise or challenge power.”9 Whilst there is, of course, a concern “to situate past events 
or utterances in their ‘context’ so as to avoid the accusation of anachronism,”10 Koskenniemi maintains 
that “[t]he past is a construction, informed by present concerns.”11 This focus on “present concerns” 
connects with Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s question of “[w]here … the history of human rights  
begin[s],”12 and with their “view of history … [as something with an] open-ended and polyvalent 
nature.”13  
There is a tension in this concern with origins and the simultaneous insistence on history’s polyvalence. 
This tension says something important about human rights theory and scholarship, with a significance 
that extends beyond Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s book. They approach human rights “as forming 
a language, a vocabulary … a discourse.”14 That approach translates into a view of human rights as “an 
endless semantic battlefield upon which participants argue over the meaning of key concepts,”15 in 
opposition to what Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari label “the textbook narrative”:16  
[A] hagiographic tale … of the past as unilinear progress and global improvement in which humanity 
is on a steady march away from superstition, cultural fanaticism and irrationality towards 
secularization, rationality and modernity … [culminating in] the eventual dawn of the ‘age of 
rights’.17 
Opposing ideas of “unilinear progress,” Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari emphasise “the concept of the 
human as an autonomous individual,”18 outlining an understanding of human rights built around 
“entitlements,” “relationships” between individuals and collectives, and “the notion of freedom and the 
                                                          
7 P. Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari, “Revisiting the origins of human rights: Introduction”, in P. Slotte and M. 
Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 1.  
8 Ibid.  
9 M. Koskenniemi, “Foreword: history of human rights as political intervention in the present”, in P. Slotte and 
M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) ix, xv.  
10 Ibid xv.  
11 Ibid.   
12 See text at n 7.  
13 Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, “Introduction” (n 7) 23.  
14 Ibid 22.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid 2-5, 10-16.   
17 Ibid 6.  
18 Ibid 23.  
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equal worth of all.”19 The limited sense in which their perspective is “open-ended” and “polyvalent” 
becomes clear in their insistence that it is legitimate to “[include] in this volume only chapters 
discussing actors and events within the Euro/Anglo-American world” because “the Euro/Anglo-
American world … is the relevant context for the actors who have genuinely been influential as actors 
in themselves in [human rights’] history.”20 Except for the further claim that “the contemporary human 
rights phenomenon[’s] … conceptual, ideological and institutional background simply comes forth as 
being connected to this distinct geographic and cultural region,”21 no real justification for this Euro-
American bias is offered.22  
Towards the end of their introductory chapter Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari conclude that “distinct parts 
of what we have come to know as forming the ‘history of human rights’ from the textbook narrative are 
indeed a story, a myth.”23 Appearing to suggest the formation of some new, alternative myth, they 
conclude that “these chapters do end up putting forwarding [sic] a view … that there is ‘something out 
there’ too; moments of uncanny familiarity which later appear as receiving confirmation over their 
justified role as parties to this story.”24 Rejecting any suggestion of “a starting year where we set the 
history of human rights to commence,”25 they suggest that human rights discourse is held together by a 
“delicate unity” or “shared conceptual diversity.”26 The reader might reasonably conclude that Slotte 
and Halme-Tuomisaari are not opposed to human rights myths per se, only to the particular myth of the 
“textbook narrative.” 
Something of this desire to disrupt orthodoxy whilst maintaining a loose or “delicate unity” in human 
rights discourse – to bust a particular myth without abandoning myth per se – comes through in Conor 
Gearty’s afterword. Because “the field of human rights today is finding its contrived absolutism 
unsustainable in the face of the challenges of everyday life,”27 it “must [, apparently,] dive deep into 
[its] foundations, the idea’s relationship with law – and inevitably … into [its] history” in order “[t]o 
survive.”28 Gearty, like Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, is in favour of open-endedness and polyvalence, 
but only up to a point. Expressing agreement with Lynn Hunt’s insistence that “human rights can never 
be one fixed thing, whether by declaration, bill of rights or other itemization,”29 he adds the caveat that 
“there is surely this irreducible minima of equality and of personal engagement with building a life 
                                                          
19 Ibid 23-24.  
20 Ibid 32 (emphasis in original).  
21 Ibid (emphasis in original).  
22 On this Euro-American or Western bias see B. Rajagopal, International Law From Below: Development, Social 
Movements and Third World Resistance (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), chapter 7 in particular (“Human rights and the 
Third World: constituting the discourse of resistance”). For a powerful corrective to Euro-American bias see M. 
Terretta, “From Below and to the Left?: Human Rights and Liberation Politics in Africa’s Postcolonial Age” 
(2013) 24 Journal of World History 389; M. Terretta, “‘We Had Been Fooled into Thinking that the UN Watches 
over the Entire World’: Human Rights, UN Trust Territories, and Africa’s Decolonization” (2012) 34 Human 
Rights Quarterly 329. For a broad perspective on issues of Eurocentrism see D. Otto, “Subalternity And 
International Law: The Problems of Global Community and the Incommensurability of Difference” (1996) 5 
Social and Legal Studies 337.  
23 Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, “Introduction” (n 7) 35.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
27 C. Gearty, “Afterword”, in P. Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 381, 382.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Hunt (n 3) 118, quoted by Gearty (n 27) at 384.  
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without which we are not really speaking of human rights – whatever the language we are using.”30 
There is, we seem to be told, “something out there.”31 
Gearty’s concern with what “we” are speaking about echoes his existential anxieties about the 
sustainability of human rights given “the challenges of everyday life.”32 These anxieties underpin his 
insistence that “[i]ndeterminacy can only go so far . . . [because i]t is dangerous to lose not only our 
subject’s exact verbal descriptor but its core minima as well.”33 Gearty seems concerned about the 
coherence or, in Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s terms, the “delicate unity” of human rights; about the 
durability of “we” and “our,” about ownership. “We” should, apparently, manage these concerns by 
looking to present reality’s historic origins:  
Human rights must challenge power or be subverted by it, rendered toothless by success or achieve 
a deeper kind of prosperity by standing outside realms of power holding society to account. To do 
this effectively, it must first look itself in the mirror, and in doing so gaze past today’s reflected 
image to the hinterland out of which that shape has emerged. That is what this book has endeavoured 
to do.34  
Whilst the book, as presented by Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, Koskenniemi and Gearty, engages only 
indirectly with origins, it advances a latent, sub-textual theory of origins that comes to the surface in 
Gearty’s notion of “hinterland.” The vagueness of this “hinterland” concept of origins is reflected in 
Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s ambivalence between open-endedness and polyvalence, on the one 
hand, and the conviction that there is “‘something out there’”35  some basic core, involving 
individuality, freedom and equality, that defines human rights.36  
The book seems grounded in the conviction that a vague sense of origins is necessary to sustain a 
tolerable level of coherence in human rights discourse. The origins of human rights may be nothing 
more than a myth but that is good enough if the objective is to use a concept of origins as a mythical 
“hinterland” that sustains a “delicate unity” within the discourse.37 Mythical, “hinterland”-type origins 
cannot be used to identify a  specific point of origin for human rights but, if the goal is a tolerable level 
of discursive coherence, that is not – so the argument goes – necessary.  
Notwithstanding its title (Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights), then, the book is concerned with 
origins only in a second-order sense. Maintaining relative coherence in human rights discourse, 
balancing open-endedness and polyvalence with some sense of the discourse’s boundaries,38 is the 
book’s primary concern. For Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari origins are a means to an end – that end 
being relative coherence in human rights discourse – rather than an end in themselves.  
Consistent with this ‘means-ends’, ‘second order’ concern with origins, the book’s concept of origins 
as “hinterland” needs to be seen as structural in nature. This structural concept of origins as “hinterland” 
makes it possible to draw boundaries around the discourse:  
                                                          
30 Gearty (n 27) 384.  
31 See quotation from Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari at n 24.  
32 See Gearty quotation at n 27.   
33 Gearty (n 27) 385.  
34 Ibid 388.  
35 See quotation at n 24.  
36 See text (including quotations from Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari) at n 18 and n 19.  
37 “delicate unity” – see quotation from Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari at n 26.  
38 On open-endedness and polyvalence see quotations at n 8 and n 13. 
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Without a litmus test for distinguishing between ‘authentic’ from merely supposed rights . . . there 
is no limit to the kinds of policy that may be translated into the language of rights. What gets included 
or excluded in this way reflects the dependency of the process of narration on a choice of a relevant 
conceptual and ideological frame, a choice informed by no (‘ultimate’) structure beyond the 
narrator’s inherited aesthetic-political bias. This is why narrations of human rights often illuminate 
the present at least as much as they inform us about the past.39 
The aim, here, is to distinguish the inside from the outside, as opposed to specifying the content of 
human rights discourse – hence Koskenniemi’s disavowal of any “(‘ultimate’) structure,” and Slotte 
and Halme-Tuomisaari’s rejection of “a starting year where we set the history of human rights to 
commence.”40 Gearty captures the looseness of the book’s approach to structure, noting that “[t]he 
power of the language of human rights has been its ability … to provide a formula around which both 
the givers and the takers can coalesce.”41 This sense of human rights as a relatively contentless 
“formula” reflects Martti Koskenniemi’s account of international law’s ontology:  
In the absence of agreement over, or knowledge of, the ‘true’ objectives of political community – 
that is to say, in an agnostic world – the pure form of international law provides the shared surface 
– the only such surface – on which political adversaries recognize each other as such and pursue 
their adversity in terms of something shared, instead of seeking to attain full exclusion – ‘outlawry’ 
– of the other. In this sense, international law’s value and its misery lie in its being the fragile surface 
of political community among social agents – States, other communities, individuals – who disagree 
about their preferences but do this within a structure that invites them to argue in terms of an assumed 
universality.42 
Koskenniemi recognises the complexity and challenges of contemporary world affairs (“an agnostic 
world”) but expresses faith in international law as a moderating, pacifying influence (“the shared 
surface”). Consistent with that faith, in his landmark book, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 
Koskenniemi calls for a “culture of formalism” on the basis of an historical account stretching from 
1870 to 1960.43 This “culture” is founded on a commitment to legal texts and norms,44 insists on the 
value of “a practice that builds on formal arguments that are available to all under conditions of 
equality,”45 and maintains that “absent the possibility of building social life on unmediated love or 
universal reason, persuading people to bracket their own sensibilities and learn openness for others, is 
not worthless.”46 This sense of international law as a “pure form” connects with Slotte and Halme-
Tuomisaari’s suggestion that there is “something out there” – some minimal yet necessary core in 
human rights discourse, an essential if loosely defined form – and with Gearty’s notion of origins as 
                                                          
39 Koskenniemi, “Foreword” (n 9) xviii. First sentence of quotation (from “Without a litmus test” to “the 
language of rights”) quoted with approval by Gearty (n 27) at 387-388.   
40 Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, “Introduction” (n 7) 35 (also quoted at n 25).   
41 Gearty (n 27) 387.  
42 M. Koskenniemi, “What is International Law For?”, in M. D. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford: OUP, 
2018, 5th edn.) 28, 46-47 (emphasis in original).  
43 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2001), 494-509.   
44 See ibid 497-501, concerning a May 1966 debate between Professors A.J. Thomas, Adolf Berle and Wolfgang 
Friedmann which Koskenniemi uses to illustrate the value of the “culture of formalism.” For analysis of the 
“culture of formalism” and this May 1966 debate see M. Nicholson, “Psychoanalyzing International Law(yers)” 
(2017) 18(3) German Law Journal 441, at 470-475.    
45 Ibid 501.  
46 Ibid 502.  
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“hinterland.”47 These positions are structural and anti-substantive, focussing not on the necessary 
content of the law but on the necessity of a form or structure that offers a degree of stability and 
durability.  
Samuel Moyn – a contributor to Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s book – critiques this formalism, 
arguing that Gentle Civilizer’s “internalism” – that is, its study of international law through the work of 
past international lawyers such as Hersch Lauterpacht and Hans Kelsen – “made difficult the evaluation 
of the political uses of – and especially the political alternatives to – international law, especially for 
progressive causes.”48 For Moyn Koskenniemi’s “neo-formalism proved historiographically, as well as 
politically misleading . . . because his version of historiography failed to situate international law within 
a larger set of actual and possible modes of politics.”49 Focussing on post-9/11 realities and the USA’s 
willingness to reject international legal constraint in its “war on terror,” Moyn notes that Koskenniemi 
“had set out before 9/11 occurred to revive formalism for the left rather than a version of the critical 
legal studies more sceptical about form and more open to its political uses.”50 For Moyn, in the post-
9/11 world “international law is our most attractive option for thinking about a better world" only 
because “superior and more transformative alternatives [are] unavailable for the time being.”51  
Moyn suggests that Koskenniemi has a relatively superficial interest in international law’s origins, 
observing that “if one concludes that the turn to history is properly motivated by the desire to put the 
present in perspective and achieve critical purchase on it, the ‘origins’ debate simply doesn’t get very 
far.”52 My argument is that Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari are as dis-interested in the origins of human 
rights as Koskenniemi is, on Moyn’s analysis, in the origins of international law. Maintaining or 
stabilising the structure of present-day discourse is the real concern for both.   
This leads to an idea of history as a means of  as Moyn puts it  “put[ting] the present in perspective,” 
and the notion of origins as “hinterland.” Such structuralist thinking aims to stabilise the historic 
discourse, and it is vital if the aim is to maintain a discourse or practice in its existing, inherited form. 
But if the goal is to connect a discourse or practice with contemporary realities such thinking is 
essentially useless, precisely because it rests on the assumption that forms and cultures inherited from 
the past are the means to engage with contemporary reality.53 Equally, such thinking lacks the capacity 
to contest the nature or form of that inheritance, hence the ease with which Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari 
assert the Euro-American nature of human rights,54 seemingly untroubled by the fact that their book not 
only focusses on “actors and events within the Euro/Anglo-American world,”55 but is written by 
academics working at institutions located in that world (Canada, USA, UK, Finland, France).56 An 
emphasis on past forms and inherited cultures ignores the possibility that the contemporary realities of, 
                                                          
47 “pure form” – see Koskenniemi quotation at n 42; “something out there” – see Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari 
quotation at n 24; “hinterland” – see Gearty quotation at n 34.  
48 S. Moyn, “Martti Koskenniemi and the Historiography of International Law in the Age of the War on Terror”, 
in W. Werner, M. de Hoon and A. Galán (eds.), The Law of International Lawyers: Reading Martti Koskenniemi 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2017) 340, 341.  
49 Ibid 341. 
50 Ibid 352.  
51 Ibid 355.  
52 Ibid 348.  
53 See M. Nicholson, “Walter Benjamin and the Re-Imageination of International Law” (2016) 27 Law and 
Critique 103; Nicholson, “Psychoanalyzing International Law(yers)” (n 44).   
54 See text at n 19 to n 21.  
55 Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, “Introduction” (n 7) 32 
56 See the list of contributors at Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, Revisiting (n 1) vii-viii.  
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say, COVID-19, climate change, Black Lives Matter, Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Narendra Modi 
may need to be engaged on their own terms.57  
Boundaries, Templates 
Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s “hinterland,” “something out there” concept of origins tends, I 
suggest, towards an exclusionary, elitist, Euro-American understanding of human rights discourse, 
grounded in ideas of tradition, inheritance and boundaries. It sees the “hinterland” of past creative 
efforts as the foundation for a human rights response to the contemporary situation, treating patterns 
established by past creativity as boundaries or templates for present-day thought and practice. 
Consistent with this idea of boundaries or templates, Jacob Giltaij and Kaius Tuori argue that “there is 
a point in the argument that Roman lawyers may have developed ideas comparable to a modern notion 
of human rights.”58 Working with a similar logic, Virpi Mäkinen traces the emergence of human rights 
out of “voluntarist philosophy,” notions of self, and the thinking of medieval figures such as Scotus and 
William of Ockham who “placed at the centre of their psychological attention the individual with his 
or her pure will and active powers.”59 
Annabel Brett draws a boundary around contemporary human rights discourse by contrasting it with 
“the Thomist tradition,” emphasising the distinctiveness of human rights as “a programme, an outlook, 
embedded in our political and cultural imagination and sensibility.”60 She maintains that “[w]e have 
nothing to gain, and everything to lose, in translating the thought either of [Thomas] Aquinas, or of 
early modern Thomists, or of early modern natural rights theorists more generally, into the idiom of 
human rights,”61 focussing on the violence of the Thomist inheritance and noting that “[Domingo de] 
Soto … views the hanging of thieves and the burning of heretics as entirely justified” whilst “[Francisco 
de] Vitoria’s idea of what is permissible in war is horrific.”62 Such views amount, in Brett’s view, to 
“legitimations of actions that we would regard as in absolute violation of any notion of human rights,”63 
drawing lessons for “our own thinking” from such contrasts between Soto’s and Vitoria’s thinking and 
the human rights “programme.”64 
Brett’s relatively consoling message is counterbalanced by Lauren Benton’s and Aaron Slater’s 
emphasis on the continuity between British imperial practices and contemporary human rights. Benton 
and Slater highlight the ways in which “rights claims … may prove to be unstable amalgams, forged by 
particular historical circumstances and devoted not to the vindication of human rights, but rather to the 
imposition of order within definable political communities.”65 Lynn Hunt offers an account of human 
rights as a critical, progressive tool, using the English Civil War, the French Revolution, and the 
                                                          
57 On this theme see Nicholson, “Walter Benjamin” (n 53), and M. Nicholson, Re-Situating Utopia (Leiden: Brill, 
2019).  
58 Giltaij and Tuori (n 2) 62.  
59 V. Mäkinen, “Medieval natural rights discourse”, in P. Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the 
Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 64, 71. 
60 A. Brett, “Human rights and the Thomist tradition” in P. Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting 
the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 82, 101.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid.  
65 L. Benton and A. Slater, “Constituting the imperial community: rights, common good and authority in Britain’s 
Atlantic empire, 1607-1815” in P. Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 140, 162. 
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American Declaration of Independence to draw a boundary around human rights as a field of 
revolutionary practice.66  
Samuel Moyn directs attention away from the history of human rights and towards “a history of human 
duties more faithful to the realities of the past than its predecessor,”67 employing Italian nineteenth-
century rights theorist Giuseppe Mazzini as guide. Moving from Moyn’s macro level to the micro, 
Kathryn Kish Sklar considers the importance of mid-nineteenth century women’s rights conventions in 
the United States, tracing the connections between those events and women’s “central[ity] to the process 
by which ‘human rights’ returned to public discourse in the mid-twentieth century.”68 She suggests that 
boundaries might be re-drawn by paying attention to “lived reality” in “‘small places’” and by focussing 
on “the ways that human rights discourse has been shaped and used by particular groups in particular 
temporal and geographic locations.”69 
Martin Ceadel’s chapter on “The peace movement and human rights” has no obvious connection with 
the theme of origins,70 perhaps because it seems to have been written in response to the book’s now-
abandoned working title of “‘Human Rights and Other Stories.’”71 Gregory Claeys returns to the book’s 
more general theme, situating a particular contemporary topic in its historical “hinterland.”72 Claeys 
contests the orthodoxy that economic rights are “less essential, pure, substantial, meaningful or 
defensible than other rights,”73 advancing his argument through a review that touches on Thomas Paine, 
Robert Owen, Mary Wollstonecraft, and J.S. Mill, whilst devoting particular attention to revolutionary 
and post-revolutionary France.   
A final set of chapters focus on “[i]nstitutional practices.”74 Dzovinar Kévonian considers the work of 
André Mandelstam, author of the Institut de Droit International’s 1929 Declaration of the International 
Rights of Man.75 Kévonian’s method is reminiscent of Koskenniemi’s approach in Gentle Civilizer:76 
“[A] study of the settings and networks for the production and reception of discourse, relating individual 
trajectories to social and academic affiliations, and the tension between commitment and formalism.”77 
The concept of law and discourse underpinning this inquiry is inherently structural. It finds the 
“hinterland” of contemporary human rights in the work of the “men of 1873,”78 the founders and leaders 
of the Institut de Droit International, the men, like Mandelstam, who debated the 1929 Declaration. 
Taina Tuori studies the League of Nations’ mandates system as something that “can be seen as a more 
humane regime, in comparison to traditional colonial rule, warranting the discussion under the label of 
                                                          
66 Hunt (n 3).  
67 Moyn, “Giuseppe Mazzini” (n 4) 139.  
68 K. Kish Sklar, “Human rights discourse in women’s rights conventions in the United States, 1848-70”, in P. 
Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 
163, 186.  
69 Ibid 187-188.  
70 Ceadel (n 5).  
71 Ibid 205.  
72 G. Claeys, “Socialism and the language of rights: the origins and implications of economic rights”, in P. Slotte 
and M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 206.  
73 Ibid 206.  
74 Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, Revisiting (n 1) 237.  
75 D. Kévonian, “André Mandelstam and the internationalization of human rights (1869-1949)”, in P. Slotte and 
M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 239 – see 
259-265 on the 1929 Declaration.  
76 See Kévonian, ibid, at 244, on parallels with Koskenniemi’s work.  
77 Kévonian (n 75) 265.  
78 Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer (n 43) 502.  
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human rights,”79 whilst Pamela Slotte considers “those years prior to the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights . . . in 1948, a time before the human rights vocabulary achieved the 
hegemonic status that many attribute to it today.”80 The precise message that Slotte seeks to extract 
from this inquiry is, at least to me, not clear but, in looking towards the “hinterland” of contemporary 
human rights and the UDHR in particular, her approach fits with the book’s general methodology.  
Halme-Tuomisaari’s penultimate chapter tells a “story” about “the elitism of the contemporary human 
rights phenomenon,”81 emphasising that “human rights action [is and has been] … characterized by 
personal relations, patterns of privilege and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.”82 She focuses, for 
example, on a 2nd May 1945 meeting at San Francisco’s Fairmont Hotel between US Secretary of State 
Edward Stettinius and human rights lobbyists James Shotwell and Clark Eichelberger,83 recounting and 
contesting the standard narrative that human rights became a core part of the UN’s structure because of 
this meeting.84 Considering similar themes of privilege and power, in the book’s concluding chapter 
Olivier Barsalou draws attention to US influence in human rights thinking in the early stages of the 
Cold War.85  
 
Opposing the search for an historic “hinterland” that permeates Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s book, 
I argue that any response to the contemporary situation should not be grounded in ideas of tradition or 
culture, nor should contemporary thought and praxis remain within boundaries laid down by past 
creative efforts.86 Writing a “history of human rights” certainly can be, as Martti Koskenniemi suggests 
in the title of his foreword, a “political intervention in the present,”87 but the past is neither the priority 
nor the starting point. A creative response grounded in and emerging out of the realities of the 
contemporary present is required, in place of this book’s effort to define the “hinterland” of the past as 
the means of engaging with the present.88 Drawing on the work of early twentieth-century philosopher 
and cultural theorist Walter Benjamin, I argue that the value of the concept of origin does not lie in 
something like Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s search for origins in the past but in the possibility of 
re-origination in the here and now.89 I base that argument on Benjamin’s The Origin of German Tragic 
                                                          
79 T. Tuori, “From League of Nations Mandates to decolonization: a brief history of rights”, in P. Slotte and M. 
Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2018 [2015]) 267, 292.  
80  P. Slotte,“‘Blessed are the peacemakers’: Christian internationalism, ecumenical voices and the quest for 
human rights”, in P. Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2018 [2015]) 293, 296.  
81 M. Halme-Tuomisaari, “Lobbying for relevance: American internationalists, French civil libertarians and the 
UDHR”, in P. Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari (eds.), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 
2018 [2015]) 330, 332 and 331.  
82 Ibid 333.  
83 Ibid 335-336.  
84 Ibid 338-341.  
85 Barsalou (n 6).  
86 On this point see Nicholson, “Walter Benjamin” (n 53).  
87 Koskenniemi, “Foreword” (n 9).  
88 On the tendency of law and legal thinking to operate in this way see T. W. Adorno (E.B. Ashton trans.), Negative 
Dialectics (New York: Continuum, 2007 [1966]) 309: “The total legal realm is one of definitions. Its systematic 
forbids the admission of anything that eludes their closed circle, of anything quod non est in actis.” On this general 
point see Nicholson, “Walter Benjamin” (n 53), and Nicholson, Re-Situating Utopia (n 57).  
89 See W. Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in W. Benjamin (H. Arendt ed., H. Zorn trans.), 
Illuminations (London: Pimlico, 1999 [1950]) 245, 255: “Historicism contents itself with establishing a causal 
connection between various moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It 
became historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be separated from it by thousands of years. 
A historian who takes this as his [sic] point of departure stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of a 
rosary. Instead, he [sic] grasps the constellations which his [sic] own era has formed with a definite earlier one. 
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Drama,90 a landmark 1925 work that sets out a radical concept of origin, “seek[ing] to think through 
the very foundations of philosophy, while also aiming to dismantle the conceptual apparatus that 
upholds various misconceptions prevalent in the discipline of history.”91  
History, on this view, is not a means of stabilising or maintaining orthodoxies about the nature of the 
present via the past, a means of establishing the “hinterland” of existing discourse, of determining who 
or what is on the inside and who or what is on the outside.92  History is, rather, a library,93 a collection 
of “rags” or “refuse,”94 of “fragments,”95 to be constellated or arranged by every author, artist, or 
collector,96 as they try to disturb and re-frame established models, creating new images of the present 
that open up myriad possible futures.97 From this Benjaminian perspective Slotte’s and Halme-
Tuomisaari’s understanding of origin as “hinterland” is everything origin is not.  
On Origin(ation)  
To be original, it might be thought, is to be first; to originate or create something that did not previously 
exist. ‘The original’ has primacy and authority over everything that comes after it purely because it 
came first. Every individual element in a class, genre, discipline, field, form, practice, sequence or 
tradition established by ‘the original’ must articulate, or at least be capable of articulating, a connection 
to ‘the original’. Any element that cannot articulate that connection faces potential exclusion from that 
chain that ‘the original’ started. Such exclusion prevents non-conformist elements establishing 
themselves as new points of origin, blocking any attempt they might make to disrupt or re-start the 
established sequence.  
Exclusion from the established sequence does not, of course, prevent the excluded element establishing 
an entirely new sequence. But it does stop the excluded element inheriting the influence and lineage of 
‘the original.’ Exclusion (whether actual or possible), then, has the effect of creating a binary choice for 
the outlier, the excluded element. It can submit to the established sequence, define its existence by 
reference to provenance in ‘the original,’ and retain / regain its place in the established sequence, or it 
can originate something new and entirely separate from the established sequence. The only thing the 
                                                          
Thus, he [sic] establishes a concept of the present as the ‘time of the now’ which is shot through with chips of 
Messianic time.” See also Nicholson, “Walter Benjamin” (n 53).  
90 W. Benjamin (J. Osborne trans.), The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, 1998 [1963]).  
91 B. Hanssen, “Philosophy at Its Origin: Walter Benjamin’s Prologue to the Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels” 
(1995) 110(4) MLN 809, 821.  
92 See text (including quotation) at around n 39. 
93 W. Benjamin, “Unpacking My Library”, in W. Benjamin (H. Arendt ed., H. Zorn trans.), Illuminations (London: 
Pimlico, 1999 [1950]) 61.  
94 W. Benjamin (H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin trans.), The Arcades Project (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap 
Press, 2002) 460 (N1a, 8): “Method of this project: literary montage. I needn’t say anything. Merely show. I shall 
purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations. But the rags, the refuse – these I will not inventory 
but allow, in the only way possible, to come into their own: by making use of them.” See also ibid at 461 (N2, 6): 
“[A]ssemble large-scale constructions out of the smallest and most precisely cut components …discover in the 
analysis of the small individual moment the crystal of the total event … grasp the construction of history as such. 
In the structure of commentary. Refuse of History ” 
95 Benjamin, The Origin (n 90) 29: “The value of fragments of thought is all the greater the less direct their 
relationship to the underlying idea … truth-content is only to be grasped through immersion in the most minute 
details of subject-matter.” 
96 Benjamin, “Unpacking” (n 93) 62: “[T]here is in the life of the collector a dialectical tension between the poles 
of disorder and order.” On constellation see Benjamin, The Origin (n 90) 34. 
97 See Nicholson (n 53), in particular at 118-123 (on ‘Allegorical- Representational Practice’).  
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excluded element cannot do – on pain of / as a consequence of exclusion – is re-originate the established 
sequence.  
Philosopher and cultural theorist Walter Benjamin, writing about German tragic drama in 1925, sets 
himself against such commonplace thinking. He concedes that origin is “an entirely historical category” 
but “nevertheless [insists that it has] nothing to do with genesis.”98 For Benjamin “[t]he term origin is 
not intended to describe the process by which the existent came into being, but rather to describe that 
which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearance.”99 Rejecting attempts to “define ideas 
inductively … on the basis of popular linguistic usage” as destined to “lead nowhere,”100 he critiques 
those who would “make words into concepts embracing whole species in order to be more sure of 
them.”101 Benjamin is interested in the outlier, the non-conformist:  
It is … precisely the more significant works, inasmuch as they are not the original and, so to speak, 
ideal embodiments of the genre, which fall outside the limits of genre. A major work will either 
establish the genre or abolish it; and the perfect work will do both.102 
Rejecting “‘critics … [with] the habit of measuring [works of art] against the genre or the particular art-
form to which, in the critic’s opinion, they belong,’”103 Benjamin endorses the view that “‘individual 
works of art … are infinite in number: all are original, and none can be translated into another.’”104 
Whilst the individuality of each work translates into a rejection of genre itself, because of its limiting, 
classificatory tendencies,105 Benjamin nevertheless insists on the importance of central, “fruitful ideas, 
such as [in the case of dramatic art] the tragic or the comic.”106  
In place of an emphasis on genre, Benjamin offers a theory of representation that builds up from the 
particular (the individual work of art) rather than down from the general (the art-form). Prioritising 
artistic representation over systematized knowledge,107 he insists on the priority of the individual or 
particular: “The value of fragments of thought is all the greater the less direct their relationship to the 
underlying idea … truth-content is only to be grasped through immersion in the most minute details of 
subject-matter.”108 Individual phenomena have priority over the idea which seeks to group phenomena 
together.109 As Susan Buck-Morss explains, Benjamin’s method involves “constructing the general 
from out of the disparate particulars themselves”:110 
In his theory each ‘idea,’ each construction out of the particular, was self-contained. As a ‘monad,’ 
each contained the totality, a ‘picture of the world,’ yet each differed from every other idea. … [I]n 
                                                          
98 Benjamin, The Origin (n 90) 45.  
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid 38-39.  
101 Ibid 39.  
102 Ibid 44.  
103 Ibid 43 (quoting Benedetto Croce).  
104 Ibid (quoting Croce).  
105 Ibid 43-44 (quoting Croce): “‘Considered philosophically, nothing is interposed between the universal and the 
individual, no sequence of genres or species, no generalia.’” 
106 Ibid 44.  
107 Ibid 28: “If philosophy is to remain true to the law of its own form, as the representation of truth and not as a 
guide to the acquisition of knowledge, then the exercise of this form – rather than its anticipation in the system – 
must be accorded due importance.” 
108 Ibid 29. On the value of Benjaminian theories of this kind for international law see Nicholson, “Walter 
Benjamin” (n 53).  
109 See Benjamin, The Origin (n 90) 34-35 on phenomena and idea.  
110 S. Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt 
Institute (New York: Free Press, 1979) 94.  
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constructing ideas it was continuously necessary to return to the phenomena themselves, the more 
so as the ideas were not eternal but historically specific constellations.111    
Benjamin’s insistence on origin as something that “describe[s] that which emerges from the process of 
becoming and disappearance,”112 rather than a point of pure “genesis,”113 expresses the importance of 
“return[ing] to the phenomena themselves.” Origin, as a process of representing and re-presenting 
phenomena in “historically specific constellations ” – in arrangements or narratives specific to the time, 
context and circumstances in which they are created – is dialectically opposed to a concept of origin as 
“genesis” that requires each element to secure its place in the genre or tradition on the basis of its 
connection to ‘the original.’  
Benjamin’s re-presentational concept of origin focuses on the possibility of re-origination, prioritising 
“becoming and disappearance” in the here and now over what already came,114 whilst a “genesis” 
oriented concept of origin maintains the authority of ‘the original.’ I noted, in the opening paragraph of 
this article, that Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s book says relatively little about what origins are or 
how they might be theorised within human rights discourse. The reason for this, I suggest, is that the 
book adopts “genesis”-oriented thinking about origins, without reflecting on the possibility of other 
approaches, such as that developed in Benjamin’s work. This is more than a criticism of this book; it 
reflects the limit of current thinking about the history and origins of international human rights law. 
The introductory chapter of Akira Iriye’s, Petra Goedde’s and William I Hitchcock’s edited volume The 
Human Rights Revolution: An International History outlines a view of human rights consistent with  
Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s “genesis” oriented approach.115 Because “the language of human 
rights is fluid,”116 treating “‘human rights’ [as] an empty signifier … seems to be a useful starting 
point.”117 Whilst Iriye and Goedde invite a range of views, noting that “[i]f the history of human rights 
starts to get written from a variety of perspectives, we will be in a better position to develop a more 
realistic balance sheet of its successes and failures,”118 they cling to an idea of human rights as an “it”  
– an idea akin to Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari’s notion of “something out there”119 – with a traceable 
history or “hinterland.”  
A desire to identify the “hinterland” of contemporary human rights drives Jenny Martinez’s The Slave 
Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law, an account of nineteenth century Mixed 
Commissions – an early form of international tribunal established by treaties between the UK and other 
seafaring states prohibiting the slave trade.120 For Martinez “[t]he story of the abolition of the slave 
trade is a good one for international law, for human rights and for humanity,”121 and she reminds 
international lawyers of what she sees as its valuable lesson.122 Like Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, 
                                                          
111 Ibid.  
112 See quotation from Benjamin at n 99.  
113 See quotation from Benjamin at n 98.  
114 On this see Nicholson, “Walter Benjamin” (n 53).   
115 A. Iriye and P. Goedde, “Introduction: Human Rights as History”, in A. Iriye, P. Goedde and W. I. Hitchcock, 
The Human Rights Revolution: An International History (Oxford: OUP, 2012) 27. 
116 Ibid 35.  
117 Ibid.  
118 Ibid 44.  
119 See quotation from Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari at n 24.  
120 J. S. Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012).  
121 Ibid 158.  
122 Ibid 149: “Scholars are just beginning to fill in the missing pieces of the pre-World War II history of 
international law as a mechanism for the protection of human rights, and the anti-slave trade movement is a central 
part of that missing picture.”   
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Martinez adopts a “genesis”-oriented perspective on human rights’ history and origins, maintaining and 
strengthening the existing discourse by reaching back into its “hinterland.”  
Micheline R Ishay’s map of  human rights’ “hinterland”  “A Chronology of Events and Writings 
Related to Human Rights”  is presented in a table that extends over eleven pages, stretching from the 
1545 work of Bartolomé de las Casas to the 2002 World Economic Forum protests in Washington 
D.C.123 She argues that “[h]uman rights are … the result of a cumulative historical process that takes 
on a life of its own,”124 insisting that whilst Walter Benjamin was right to observe that “‘[t]here is no 
document of civilization … which is not at the same time a document of barbarism,’”125 it is also the 
case that “[a] human rights document may be marred by barbarism, [and] yet … [be] a barometer of 
human rights progress.”126 Here, Ishay ignores Benjamin’s related observation that “[t]he concept of 
progress must be grounded in the idea of catastrophe. That things are ‘status quo’ is the catastrophe.”127  
Ishay’s insistence that there is progress within barbarism reflects a wider point about structuralist 
approaches to human rights’ history. There is a desire to retain the essence of the structure, the sense of 
“something out there,” whilst recognising and exploring the injustices and exclusions that the structure 
has produced. For Ishay “Walter Benjamin’s Angel of History shows us, through the drama and 
struggles of the past, the steps leading toward a new paradise,”128 yet Benjamin is clear that “a storm is 
blowing from Paradise.”129 “[T]he pile of debris before [the Angel] … grows skyward” as the angel is 
blown further and further away from Paradise;130 “hell is not something that awaits us, but this life here 
and now.”131 
Samuel Moyn’s work is an important recent example of structuralist thinking about the history of human 
rights, redefining human rights’ history by emphasising marginalised aspects or interpretations. Moyn 
maintains that the origins of the contemporary international human rights movement lie in the 1970s 
and not, as is more usually thought, in the 1940s,132 that the connection between Christianity and human 
rights thinking is key to an understanding of international human rights and not a mere aspect of human 
rights’ history.133 Moyn’s most recent corrective to the orthodoxy argues that human rights must focus 
on socio-economic justice, pursuing genuine equality in place of mere sufficiency.134 His chapter in 
Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s book seeks to resurrect an overlooked human rights historian and his 
emphasis on duties rather than rights,135 suggesting that “the vogue of the history of human rights may 
                                                          
123 M. R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2008) 357-367.  
124 Ibid 2.  
125 Ibid (quoting Benjamin).  
126 Ibid 3.  
127 Benjamin, Arcades (n 94) 473 (N9a,1).  
128 Ishay (n 123) 355. 
129 Benjamin, “Theses” (n 89) 249 (emphasis added).  
130 Ibid.  
131 Benjamin, Arcades (n 94) 473 (N9a,1).  
132 S. Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2010).  
133 S. Moyn, Christian Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).   
134 S. Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2018). On correctives see Moyn “Giuseppe Mazzini” (n 4) 119, commenting, in relation 
to his own past work, that “[t]he point was never to deny continuity in language, mobilization or vision, but rather 
to dispute a retrospective emphasis on inexorable and triumphal continuity by featuring alternative meanings and 
emphasizing contingent outcomes …whatever the value of correctives and the responses they elicit, I personally 
find no more interest in challenging the conventional wisdom or textbook narrative.” For a more comprehensive 
review and critique of Moyn’s work in general see Nicholson, Re-Situating Utopia (n 57).  
135 See text at around n 67.  
14 
 
soon give way to a history of human duties more faithful to the realities of the past than its 
predecessor.”136 Moyn’s work suggests that the history, structure or point of origin needs to be seen or 
constructed differently, stopping short of the more radical proposal – which I am advancing here, 
drawing on Benjamin’s thought – that the very idea of a structured history with a point of origin needs 
to be contested.   
Intervening in The Present 
Core features of contemporary global reality  climate change, or a perceived rise in authoritarianism, 
for example137  are almost entirely absent from Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s book, raising 
questions about the extent to which the book is, to borrow Koskenniemi’s phrase, a meaningful 
“political intervention in the present.”138 If “the challenges of everyday life” threaten human rights 
discourse,139 because human rights discourse does not speak to “everyday life”, then surely a re-
imagination of human rights discourse is needed.140 Slotte’s and Halme-Tuomisaari’s book pursues the 
opposite agenda, using historical inquiry into the “hinterland” of contemporary human rights discourse 
to maintain the “delicate unity,”141 the inherited structure, of human rights discourse. As argued above, 
this approaches origins instrumentally, as a means of maintaining the existing discourse through a 
process of historicization, for the benefit of those who identify with it. I am suggesting that the true 
power of origin resides, as Benjamin argues, in the possibility of present-day re-origination.  
Rather than seeking to re-enforce the coherence or structure of human rights discourse through 
historicization, human rights practice should be approached as an exercise in creating momentary, 
“historically specific constellations.”142 Human rights thought and practice should not, I suggest, “dive 
deep into [its] foundations” in order “[t]o survive”143 – that approach is premised on the conviction that 
the survival of the inherited structure is the priority. Engaging with contemporary reality is, I argue, a 
higher priority and, in pursuit of that priority, the past should be seen as a collection of “rags” or 
“fragments” to be constellated in arrangements that say something about the present and its future.144 
If, as Benjamin maintains, the fact “[t]hat things are ‘status quo’ is the catastrophe”145 – as contemporary 
phenomena like climate change would seem to suggest – then projects like Slotte’s and Halme-
Tuomisaari’s that seek merely to understand the present on the basis of past origins only perpetuate the 
catastrophe.146  
                                                          
136 Moyn, “Giuseppe Mazzini” (n 4) 139.  
137 See discussion at n 57 above.  
138 See quotation from Koskenniemi at n 87. 
139 “the challenges of everyday life” – see quotation from Gearty at n 27.  
140  See Nicholson, “Walter Benjamin” (n 53).  
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144 “rags”, “fragments” and constellation – see n 94, n 95 and n 96.  
145 See quotation from Benjamin at n 127.  
146 See Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, ‘Introduction’ (n 7) 36: “[W]e hope that [this book] contributes to and 
inspire [sic] both renewed as well as more sustained collective ‘reengagement’ with the theme, thus slowly 
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